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Emergent antibiotic-resistant bacterial infections are an increasingly significant source of morbid-
ity and mortality. Antibiotic-resistant organisms have a natural reservoir in hospitals, and recent
estimates suggest that almost 2 million people develop hospital-acquired infections each year in the
US alone. We investigate a network induced by the transfer of Medicare patients across US hospi-
tals over a 2-year period to learn about the possible role of hospital-to-hospital transfers of patients
in the spread of infections. We analyze temporal, geographical, and topological properties of the
transfer network and demonstrate, using C. Diff. as a case study, that this network may serve as a
substrate for the spread of infections. Finally, we study different strategies for the early detection
of incipient epidemics, finding that using approximately 2% of hospitals as sensors, chosen based on
their network in-degree, results in optimal performance for this early warning system, enabling the
early detection of 80% of the C. Diff. cases.
Every year in the US alone, there are 1.7 million nosocomial
infections and 99,000 associated deaths, imposing substantial
clinical and financial costs to the US health care system [1–
3]. The vast majority of these are due to antibiotic-resistant
bacteria [4], which have a natural reservoir in hospitals, pre-
senting a potentially lethal threat to already-sick patients.
The annual cost of antibiotic-resistant infections in the US
has been estimated to range from $21 billion to $34 billion
[5–7]. A 2013 CDC (Centers for Disease Control and Preven-
tion) report on antibiotic-resistant bacteria identified the lack
of infrastructure to detect and respond to emerging resistant
infections as a pressing gap.
Antibiotic-resistant organisms have a natural reservoir in
hospitals. In our study, over a two-year period, there were
nearly one million transfer events across US hospitals of Medi-
care patients alone. Given this large number of transfers,
the network of patient transfers could plausibly act as a con-
duit for antibiotic-resistant bacteria from hospital to hospital.
There are, however, only a few existing studies that have in-
vestigated the possible role of hospital-to-hospital transfers
of patients for the spread of infections. Some studies have
focused on the structure of the nationwide transfer network
associated with critical care [8–11], while others have had a
more restricted scope, limited to smaller geographical units,
such as counties [12, 14].
Local containment of antibiotic-resistant bacteria at the
level of individual hospitals is a difficult but manageable task
given that interactions between hospital wards are relatively
structured and confined spatially [15, 16]. But controlling a
larger epidemic of antibiotic-resistant bacteria or responding
to new mass outbreaks is much more challenging. This is
in part related to the complex pattern of patient movements
between hospitals, which gives rise to a broad, distributed net-
work. To better understand the role of patient transfers for
the spread of infections, we pursue three interconnected aims.
First, we investigate the structure of the hospital-to-hospital
patient transfer network in the US; second, we correlate the
incidence of nosocomial infections on a national scale with
properties of this network; and third, we develop a scalable
method for the efficient early detection of the spread of noso-
comial infections.
We start with structural analyses by first aggregating pa-
tient transfers over time to create hospital-to-hospital connec-
tions (“edges”) in the network, and we then examine static
structural properties of this network. We then demonstrate
that the transfer network is a plausible substrate for pathogen
spread by analyzing the test case of the common and highly
transmissible health-care associated infection Clostridium dif-
ficile (C. Diff. ), and showing that C. Diff. incidence in a
sample of 21 million hospital visits across the US is correlated
with the topology of the patient transfer network. Finally, we
propose a system of using a subset of the hospitals as net-
work “sensors” that might be used to monitor the nationwide
hospital system.
RESULTS
Properties of the transfer network
The transfer network shows strong seasonal, monthly, and
weekly cycles of patient transfers. The topology of the net-
work and the geography of patient transfers are closely re-
lated, with 90% of transfers between hospitals less than 200km
apart. On average, over the 2-year period, a hospital sent pa-
tients to 13.55 ± 0.15 (SE) hospitals and received patients
from 13.55 ± 0.25 hospitals. (Note that the two means nec-
essarily coincide in a directed network because each edge has
both an outgoing end and an incoming end.) The average
number of patients transferred per edge in the 2-year period
was 12.3 ± 0.63 (SE). Although the degree distributions (in-
degree and out-degree) have fat tails (more so the in-degree),
comparisons of the average clustering coefficient and the av-
erage shortest path length to randomized versions of the net-
work show that the network closely resembles a spatial net-
work. In particular, it is much more clustered than a random
network and has a high average shortest path length. Finally,
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2FIG. 1: Network of hospital-to-hospital transfers of US
Medicare patients. The network consists of hospitals that
are connected by daily transfers of patients, here aggregated
over the two-year period. Edge color encodes the number of
patients transferred through each connection.
the network shows no significant assortativity by degree. A
representation of the aggregated network is shown in Fig. 1.
(See the appendices for more details.)
Spread of C. Diff. infections
In our data, over the two-year period, there were a total
of 313,214 C. Diff. infections in the 5,677 hospitals included
in the study (after all exclusion criteria were applied). We
plot the mean C. Diff. incidence for each hospital and the
mean C. Diff. incidence for its network neighbors in Fig. 2.
We observe two distinct regimes, one for low C. Diff. in-
cidence and another for high C. Diff. incidence. The in-
cidence of the pathogen in a given hospital appears to be
correlated with the incidence of the pathogen in its network
neighbors as long as the incidence at the focal hospital is rel-
atively low; this correlation appears to vanish for hospitals
displaying higher C. Diff. incidence. One possible explana-
tion for this phenomenon is that, if there were only very few
cases of C. Diff. in the low incidence regime, the transfers
of infected patients might go undetected, therefore inducing
correlations among pathogen incidences across the network.
Conversely, if pathogen incidence were high and local, such
that hospital outbreaks are detected, patient transfers might
be restructured to curb the further spread of the infection. We
determine the boundary between the two regimes based on
the strength of correlation in pathogen incidence and assign
the value for the crossover between the two regimes (shown
as the vertical line in Fig. 2). For C. Diff. incidence below
this threshold, the Pearson correlation coefficient R ≈ 0.47
(95% CI: 0.44, 0.49) whereas above the threshold R ≈ −0.01
(95% CI: -0.08, 0.07), where the confidence intervals for the
correlation coefficients where estimated using the Fisher z-
transformation [25]. This finding on the correlation of C. Diff.
incidence across hospitals that are neighbors in the transfer
network supports the use of the transfer network as a sub-
strate for the spread of nosocomial infections.
FIG. 2: Correlation between C.diff. incidence and
transfer network structure. The horizontal axis repre-
sents the mean C. Diff. incidence at the focal hospital over
time and the vertical axis is the mean C. Diff. incidence in the
network neighborhood of that hospital (the mean taken first
over time and then over all network neighbors). We exclude
hospitals with fewer than 100 patients from subsequent corre-
lation analyses, leading to exclusion of 7.5% (428) of all hos-
pitals. The Pearson correlation coefficients are 0.47 and -0.01
for the low and high incidence regimes, respectively, which
are separated by the vertical line.
Monitoring the system for hypothetical outbreaks
We investigated the optimal selection and placement of net-
work sensors for early detection of epidemics. We used three
different strategies for selecting the sensor nodes based on
their properties in the static network, choosing them based
on their in-degree rank, out-degree rank, or choosing them
at random. Nodes with a high in-degree are expected to be
efficient at funneling in pathogens from their network envi-
ronment, whereas nodes with a high out-degree are expected
to rapidly funnel out their pathogens.
We implemented two versions of each strategy. In the static
implementation, the set of sensor hospitals was fixed in time,
whereas in the dynamic implementation different hospitals
function as sensors at different times (see Methods). In Fig. 3,
we show the results for the efficacy and the fraction of detected
cases for the three strategies for the static implementation.
The in-degree strategy achieves the highest efficacy with the
lowest number of sensors and at most uses only 108 hospitals
(1.9% of all hospitals) as sensors. The out-degree strategy
is second best and it uses 167 hospitals (2.9%) as sensors.
Both degree-based approaches outperform the random strat-
egy that uses 332 hospitals (5.9%). In terms of the fraction
of detected cases, the three strategies perform similarly: 78%
for in-degree, 81% for out-degree, and 84% for the random
strategy.
In Fig. 4, we show the efficacy and fraction of detected
cases for the three strategies for the dynamic implementa-
tion as a function of the number of sensors and the activation
time T , the length of the time period that the hospital will
3FIG. 3: Finding the optimal sensor set for the static
implementation of the surveillance system. Efficacy (a)
and fraction of detected cases (b) on the static network as a
function of the fraction of hospitals acting as sensors. The dif-
ferent curves represent different strategies for sensor selection:
random selection (black), selection proportional to in-degree
(red), and selection proportional to out-degree (blue).
be incorporated in the sensor set upon admitting a C. Diff.
patient. Except for very low activation times of the order of
a few days, the measures of efficacy and fraction of detected
cases are almost unaffected by this parameter. As can be
seen in Fig. 5, the optimal sensor set of a strategy stabilizes
after T = 5 days. These results corroborate the finding that
choosing sensors based on in-degree is the best overall strat-
egy, followed by out-degree, and then the random strategy.
All of the strategies result in similar sizes for the most effi-
cient sensor sets as in the static case. In terms of the fraction
of detected cases, all three strategies perform similarly, each
covering about 80% of the cases. We find that the average
time a sensor spends in the active state increases as a func-
tion of the activation time T . Therefore, an optimal approach
is to choose the smallest activation time T that does not de-
teriorate performance of the sensor system in terms of the
fraction of detected cases. For an activation time T = 5, the
average fraction of time sensors spend in the active state is
0.51 for in-degree based selection, 0.47 for out-degree based
selection, and 0.46 for the random strategy.
In Fig. 6 an instance for the optimal sensor set derived
from each strategy in the static implementation is plotted in
a map. Sensor hospitals are plotted in red, while their first
neighbors in blue and the rest in grey. Their size encodes the
number of C. Diff. cases they host in the full study period.
We visually see that the number of blue and red hospitals
are more or less similar for all strategies, while the number of
sensor hospitals (in red) decreases from the random (Fig. 6a),
to the out-degree (Fig. 6b), to the in-degree strategy (Fig. 6c).
FIG. 4: Finding the optimal sensor set for the dynamic
implementation of the surveillance system. Heatmaps
showing the efficacy (left column) and fraction of detected
cases (right column) on the temporal transfer network. Re-
sults are shown as a function of the fraction of hospitals acting
as sensors (horizontal axes) and the activity time that they
implement (vertical axes). The rows of panels correspond to
choosing the sensors randomly (top row), proportional to out-
degree (middle row) and proportional to in-degree (bottom
row).
FIG. 5: Efficacy of temporal sensor sets. a) Fraction
of sensors for the most efficient sensor set from the temporal
network for sensors chosen at random (black), proportional
to in-degree (red), and proportional to out-degree (blue). We
have smoothened the efficacy curves by averaging the results
using a window of 5 sensors. b) Fraction of detected cases for
the most efficient sensor set. c) Average fraction of time that
a sensor stays in the active state (same color code as on the
left).
4FIG. 6: Spatial locations of optimal sensor sets in the
static transfer network based on in-degree (a), out-degree (b),
random (c). In red are the sensor hospitals, in blue their first
neighbors and in grey those uncovered by the sensor set.
CONCLUSIONS
We studied a network defined by the transfer of 12.5M
Medicare patients across 5,667 US hospitals over a 2-year pe-
riod. We found the network to be strongly geographically
embedded, with 90% of all transfers spanning a distance less
than 200km. We found that the transfer network could plau-
sibly be used as a substrate for the spread of pathogens: we
observed a positive correlation for C. Diff. incidence between
hospitals and their network neighbors, identifying two qualita-
tively distinct regimes corresponding to low and high C. Diff.
incidence. Finally, we showed that selecting hospitals as sen-
sors based on their in-degree in the static network was able to
detect a large fraction of infections. Furthermore, an activa-
tion time of just 5 to 7 days using the dynamic sensor imple-
mentation is sufficient to achieve this surveillance with just
2% of the hospitals acting as sensors. These results support
our conceptual model that the structure of the nationwide
hospital patient transfer network is important for the spread
of health-care associated infections, likely well beyond the il-
lustrative case of C. diff considered here. In particular, our
work highlights the need to monitor the network of transfers
not just individual hospitals in order to monitor infectious
outbreaks.
It is possible that other sorts of pathogens might need a
different number of sensor hospitals, a different set of sensor
hospitals, or different surveillance windows. Nevertheless, it
is clear that the health of the entire hospital system, from the
perspective of nosocomial infections or other outbreaks, could
be monitored by leveraging the network structure of patient
transfers.
Our study has several limitations. First, the data we used
to map the hospital networks are from 2006 and 2007. How-
ever, given that hospital transfer patterns are strongly embed-
ded in the geography of the country, as we also demonstrated
here, we do not expect the age of the data to affect our re-
sults substantially. Second, we cannot assess the extent to
which unobserved policies or commercial constraints might
have affected the flow of patients from one hospital to an-
other; however, these policies merely affected patient trans-
fers, which are, in any case, observable in the current and
similar future data. Third, our analyses and models assume
that patient transfers are the only mechanism responsible for
the spread of infections. There are, of course, other vectors
or means that might result in hospitals being infected, such
as the movement of physicians, nurses, and other health care
staff between hospitals. Finally, in this analysis, we did not
make use of the fine-scale temporal information available in
transfer data; future work could evaluate how bursts of in-
fected patients, perhaps on particular days of the week, might
contribute to an epidemic.
Understanding the structure and dynamics of the hospi-
tal transfer network for the spread of real infections has a
number of important implications. Empirical data could be
used, either periodically or perhaps even in real time to map
networks of patient movement in the US health care system,
and this network could then be used monitor the spread of
nosocomial and other infections in the network. In our es-
timation, such a system could detect 80% of C. Diff. cases
using just 2% of hospitals as network sensors. Our methods
suggest practicable strategies for identifying which hospitals
should serve a surveillance function for the whole system and,
in the dynamic implementation, how long the sensors should
retain a higher level of alertness after each index case. These
tools would be useful not only for public health interventions
in the case of natural epidemics, but also in the case of delib-
erate ones, such as those due to a possible bioterror attack. In
conclusion, the actual structure and flow pattern of patients
across US hospitals confers certain specific vulnerabilities and
defenses, regardless of the biology of the pathogen per se, plac-
ing theoretical bounds on any effective containment strategy
directed at a contagious pathogen.
5MATERIALS AND METHODS
Study data
We study hospital-to-hospital transfer patterns of the entire
population of US Medicare patients over a two-year period.
Medicare provides almost universal coverage to all Americans
aged 65 and older, about 15% of the US population [17]; and
about 37% of all hospital admissions in 2003 were for Medi-
care patients [18]. We used a 100% sample of the Medicare
Provider Analysis and Review (MedPAR) files for calendar
years 2006 and 2007. The MedPAR files contain diagnosis,
procedure, and billing information on all inpatient and skilled
nursing facility (SNF) stays. Our study cohort consisted of
Medicare patients aged 65 or older with a hospital stay at
an acute medical or surgical hospital with an active record
in the American Hospital Association (AHA) 2005 database
[19]. Before applying these exclusion criteria, we identified
26.4 million stays of 12.5 million patients in 6,278 different
hospitals. After the exclusions, our final cohort consisted of
21.0 million inpatient stays of 10.4 million patients in 5,667
different hospitals.
Hospital-to-hospital transfers
According to our definition, a hospital-to-hospital transfer
occurs whenever a patient is discharged from one hospital and
admitted to another hospital on the same calendar day. Note
that a minority of transfers as defined here may not corre-
spond to actual formal transfers of patients. For example,
a patient could be discharged from hospital A and then be
re-admitted to hospital B on the same day for a reason that
is unrelated to her stay at hospital A. From an epidemiologi-
cal point of view, however, these are essentially equivalent to
formal patient transfers. (Our results change little if we relax
the definition of hospital transfers to allow the re-admission
to take place the day following the day of discharge. See the
appendices.) Using this definition of transfer, we identified
936,101 transfer events taking place between 76,003 pairs of
hospitals.
Constructing the transfer network
We consider a network representation of the patient trans-
fers across hospitals. In this framework, hospitals are repre-
sented as nodes and a transfer of a total of x patients on day
d from hospital i to hospital j is represented as a directed
edge from node i to node j with weight x on day d. The
longitudinal sequence of patient transfers forms a directed,
weighted, temporal network. We consider a static represen-
tation of the network that retains no temporal information
of patient transfers by aggregating the data for the two-year
period, where the weight of the edge from node i to node j is
the mean daily number of patient transfers through that edge,
i.e., the total number of transfers from hospital i to hospital
j during the study period divided by the number of days in
the period (730).
C. Diff. incidence on the transfer network
The transfer of infected patients from one hospital to an-
other can result in pathogen transmission between them.
Given that the MedPAR files contain diagnosis codes for each
patient, we investigated the incidence of Clostridium difficile
(C. diff.) infections and its correlation with properties of the
transfer network. C. Diff. is an anaerobic, gram-positive,
spore-forming bacteria that occurs frequently in health care
settings. It is found in over 20% of patients who have been
hospitalized for more than one week. The disease is spread
by ingestion of C. Diff. spores, which are very hardy and can
persist on environmental surfaces for months without proper
hygiene [20]. C. Diff. associated infections kill an estimated
14,000 people a year in the US as a result of institutional infec-
tions [21]. We ascertained incident cases of C. Diff. infection
by identifying any hospital admissions with ICD-9 diagnostic
code 008.45. The sensitivity and specificity of using ICD-9
codes to identify C. Diff. infections have been reported by
multiple groups to be adequate for identifying overall C. Diff.
burden for epidemiological purposes [22–24]. Given the rela-
tive C. Diff. incidence at each hospital, defined as the fraction
of patients with that particular diagnosis over the study pe-
riod, we plot the average relative C. Diff. incidence in the
neighborhood of each hospital against its own C. Diff. in-
cidence in Figure 2. We quantify the correlation using the
Pearson linear correlation coefficient.
Sensor placement on the hospital network
It might be possible to make use of the properties of
the hospital-hospital transfer network to set up a real-time
surveillance system for infections, such as a new strain of
antibiotic-resistant C. Diff. For this application, it is un-
likely that exhaustive data would be available for all hospitals
all the time, and this limitation calls for a parsimonious ap-
proach where only a subset of hospitals needs to be monitored
at any given time. We call these monitored hospitals “net-
work sensors” in the sense that they could be used to sense
incipient epidemics. We consider three different prescriptions
for sensor placement: (1) choose sensor hospitals in propor-
tion to their in-degree rank in the static network; (2) choose
sensor hospitals in proportion to their out-degree rank in the
static network; and (3) choose sensor hospitals uniformly at
random from the set of all hospitals. In our simulations, we
assume that a monitored hospital is able to detect every in-
fected patient who is present either in the hospital itself or
in any of its network neighbors to which it is connected via
patient transfers. While this assumption is made primarily
for methodological reasons and may not hold in practice, the
relative performance (the ordering) of the three prescriptions
for selecting sensors remains unaffected if the assumption were
relaxed. To learn about the potential of the hospital sensor
framework to detect epidemics, we investigate its best-case
performance by determining the optimal sensor set for the
observed data (see appendices). We expect that its perfor-
mance would be somewhat reduced for an independent test
data set (data not used as part of the training of the method).
6Determining the optimal sensor set
We define the relative efficacy of the sensor EN set as
EN =
DN
ND1
− M −DN
M
(1)
where N is the number of sensors in the sensor set, DN the
number of infected patients detected by a sensor set of N
sensors, and M is the total number of C. Diff. cases in the
network. While adding sensors to the system always improves
its overall performance, any sensor set exhibits diminishing
marginal returns in the sense that the per-sensor increment in
performance declines with each added sensor. The first term
in the definition corresponds to the number of detected cases
normalized by the number of cases that would be detected if
all sensors were as efficacious as the first sensor in the sensor
set. The second term is a penalty term that corresponds to the
fraction of undetected cases. High relative efficacy is therefore
a combination of selecting a set of sensors that are as close
as possible to the efficaciousness of the first sensor in the set
and having these sensors miss as small a proportion of cases
as possible. Note that the two terms in the definition of the
relative efficacy could be assigned different weights; however,
here, we opted for the simplest approach and only ensured
that the two contributions are measured on the same scale.
Static and dynamic implementation of network
sensors
We implement the sensor framework in two different ways.
In the static implementation, the sensors are always active,
whereas, in the dynamic implementation, the sensors are ei-
ther passive or active. When a sensor is passive, it can only
detect infections in the hospital itself. Whenever an infec-
tion is detected, the sensor either transitions from the passive
state to the active state for a period of T days or, if already in
the active state, remains in that state for another T days. In
addition to the efficacy of the sensor sets, for both implemen-
tations, we keep track of the fraction of C. Diff. cases that
are detected in order to assess the performance of the sensor
system.
Static implementation Since we know the number of
C. Diff. cases in each hospital at any given time, we sim-
ply count the number of cases in the sensor hospitals and
their network neighbors. We average the results by gener-
ating 10,000 independent realizations of sensor sets for each
of the three different prescriptions of choosing sensors (in-
degree, out-degree, random). The optimal sensor set for each
strategy is the one with maximum efficacy.
Dynamic implementation We monitor the admission times
of C. Diff. patients at each hospital, and whenever such a
patient is admitted, we incorporate the hospital in the sensor
set for T days following the admission, a time period we call
the activation time. Once added to the sensor set, the hospital
can detect the C. Diff. cases present in the hospital itself and
its network neighbors for a total of T days. The efficacy of
the sensor system therefore depends on the value of T , and we
compute the efficacy of the sensors for T from 0 to 100 days
(shown from 0 to 30 days in Fig. 5). For each combination of
parameter values, the number of sensors and the activation
time, and for each strategy of prescribing sensors, we perform
1,000 independent realizations of the sensor selection process.
We also track the average time each sensor stays in the active
state. An optimal sensor set is one that has maximal efficacy
for activation time T , minimizes the average time the sensors
stay active, and maximizes the fraction of detected cases.
We thank Laurie Meneades for the expert assistance re-
quired to build the dataset. JFG and JPO are joint first
authors of this article.
7APPENDICES
Transfer network
We characterize the temporal nature of hospital usage by
showing the time series of the number of transfers in Figure A1
(a). A clear seasonal oscillation is visible, and at a finer tem-
poral scale, a weekly periodic cycle is also observable, where
Saturdays and Sundays are the least active days of the week
and Mondays the most active and also the most variable. In
Figure A1 (b) there are periodic oscillations in many of the
quantities of interest, such as the number of patients staying
overnight at hospitals, number of admissions, discharges, and
transfers.
FIG. A1: Hospital Transfer Network HTN. a) Total
number of transfers in the system as a function of time for
the two years of data. We can see seasonal and weekly oscil-
lations. b) Median, 5- and 95-percentile for several quantities
of interest for the different days of the week.
We then examine the structural connectivity and geo-
graphic characteristics of the static transfer network (see Fig.
A2). In terms of network topology, the in-degree distribu-
tion has a broader tail than the out-degree distribution. The
network has an average (local) clustering coefficient of 0.51.
This coefficient measures the probability that any two hos-
pitals connected to an index hospital are in turn connected
to each other, forming a closed triad (a cycle of three nodes
and three edges). A random graph with the same number of
nodes and edges yields an average local clustering coefficient
of 0.0057± 0.0001 (SE), which is substantially lower than the
observed value, a finding that likely reflects the networks ge-
ographic embeddedness. The average shortest path length
of the network is 4.69. To put this number in perspective,
we performed network randomizations using a slight variant
of the directed configuration model that preserves both in-
degree and out-degree distributions [26]. This approach gave
rise to an average shortest path length of 3.6 ± 0.4 (SE). The
observed network is therefore a somewhat larger world than
what would be expected by chance, but this is almost cer-
tainly driven by the underlying geography and the objective
of keeping transfers as short as possible. In fact, about 90%
of the transfers are to hospitals less than 200km away.
FIG. A2: Topological and geographical characteristics
of the transfer network. a) Distributions for in- (red open
triangles) and out-degree (black solid circles). b) Distribution
for the number of transfers per connection ω. c) Transfer
distance distribution.
Degree assortativity is the concept that nodes with many
connections tend to be connected to other nodes with many
connections [27, 28]. When the static network is taken as
undirected, we can use the assortativity coefficient to mea-
sure the extent to which the degrees of hospitals in each pair
of connected hospitals are similar. We obtain a slightly neg-
ative value of -0.06, but similar values of -0.005 ± 0.001 (SE)
also arise from randomizations of the network using the algo-
rithm discussed above. Consequently, there is no statistically
significant assortativity in the network over and above what
would be expected by chance given the networks degree dis-
tributions.
8Robustness of the transfer extraction
Since the patient transfers are not explicit in the data but
instead need to be inferred from the data, we investigated the
robustness of some of the results to our definition of what con-
stitutes a hospital transfer. Instead of requiring readmission
on the day of discharge, we relaxed this definition by allowing
the readmission to take place also on the day after discharge.
A visual examination of Fig. A3 shows that the edges in-
duced by the same-day rule (red edges) and the additional
edges that result using the relaxed rule (blue edges). This re-
laxation leads to 67472 additional transfers (7.2% increase).
There are 11827 new edges that appear on the transfer net-
work (15.6% increase), with an average transfer load of 1.2
with a standard deviation of 0.7. For the connections that
appear under both rules, the difference in transfer loads av-
erages to 0.7 transfers with a standard deviation of 1.9. The
distribution of edge weights for both cases are shown in the
upper left panel of Fig. A4, and the two distributions appear
visually very similar to one another. The weight distribution
of the additional edges, as well as the distribution of weight
differences for the common edges in both cases can be seen
in the upper right panel of Fig. A4. The range of this dis-
tribution is much more constrained than that of the actual
weight distributions. The number of transfers increases, but
the patterns remain essentially the same both temporally and
topologically. For the temporal patterns, see the lower panels
of Fig. A4. Note also that both measures of transfers are
strictly speaking wrong, as the first one based on the one-
day rule is really a lower bound on the number of transfers
and the second one (based on the relaxed rule) is an upper
bound. Given the similarity of these findings across the two
rules, in the following we work with the lower bound (same
day discharge and readmission).
FIG. A3: Comparison of the transfer network based
on the 1-day and 2-day rules. The network is constructed
by aggretating transfer data over the full two-year period.
Red edges correspond to the connections induced by the 1-
day rule and the blue edges correspond to the additional edges
that appear when considering the 2-day rule.
FIG. A4: Comparison of transfer window of one and
two days. a) Distributions of the number of transfers per
connection in black for one day transfers (1-day rule) and in
red for one or two day transfers (2-day rule). b) Distribution
of the number of transfers per connection for the edges that
appear when using the 2-day rule. Two-day transfers (orange
diamonds) and of the difference in the number of transfers for
the connections that are shared by the two rules (green trian-
gles). c) Temporal evolution of the total number of transfers
for one day and two day transfers. The insets show a four-
week and a one-week window, showing the periodicities in
the data. d) Median, 5- and 95 percentiles for the transfers
aggregated by day of the week. Again a comparison of one
day and two day transfers demonstrates that they are quali-
tatively very similar.
Optimal sensor set
We determine the best sensor set we could have possibly
chosen given the observed data. In order to do this, we use
greedy algorithms [29] as checking all possible combinations
of hospitals to use as sensors grows exponentially in the num-
ber of hospitals and is therefore not feasible for any but the
smallest hospital transfer networks. For a fast algorithm that
is not guaranteed to give the optimal answer (as is true with
any heuristic algorithm), we choose the sensors sequentially.
We first compute the number of cases each hospital would
detect and we choose the one that will detect the highest
number of cases. We then re-compute how many new cases
would be covered by each subsequent hospital if added to the
existing sensor set. This continues until we find the sensor
set that covers all cases. As mentioned above, this procedure
does not guarantee that we will choose the optimal sensor set
given a number of sensors N, but it is however very efficient
and yields an effective sensor set not far from the optimal
one. In order to check that our solution is sufficiently close
to the actual best solution, we used simulated annealing [30].
The simulated annealing procedure is suitable for optimiza-
tion problems of large scale, especially ones where a desired
global extremum is hidden among many, poorer, local ex-
trema. There is an objective function to be minimized, in our
case the coverage of cases to be maximized, but the space over
9which that function is defined is not simply the N-dimensional
space of N continuously variable parameters. Rather, it is a
discrete, but very large, configuration space with the number
of elements factorially large, so that they cannot be explored
exhaustively. This result is in agreement with the result of
the fast sequential algorithm.
In Fig. A5 we show the results of finding the sensor set
that maximizes the number of detected cases in the training
dataset for the static network case. This method is data-based
and tries to maximize the number of detected cases without
the use of any strategy of choosing sensors other than the
optimization procedure. In this case we find that for a very
small number of 26 (0.46%) sensors, we can detect 88% of the
cases. This very high performance is however likely a con-
sequence of over-fitting the model to the observed (training)
data. Using this set of hospitals as sensors for a new dataset
on patient transfers would likely result in lower (and more
variable) performance of the sensor system.
FIG. A5: Finding the optimal number of sensors for
the best sensor selection (static network). a) shows
the efficacy and b) the fraction of detected cases, both as a
function of the fraction of hospitals used as sensors. There is a
peak for a very low fraction of sensors, but this point however
corresponds to no more than 30% of detected cases. The
second peak located at around 0.005 (using 0.5% of hospitals
as sensors) is able to detect over 80% of the cases.
In Fig. A6 we can see the results of performing the same
analysis for the dynamic implementation. Now the hospitals
that are sensors act only as sensors for a period T days af-
ter admitting a patient with a C.diff infection. The greedy
method for choosing sensors works as in the static case, but
now taking into account the temporal restrictions for the cases
that the sensor system is able to detect. The result is sim-
ilar to the results of the other methods when moving from
the static to the dynamic case. The results are different for a
small value of the activation time, below one week, but remain
basically unchanged as the activation time is raised.
FIG. A6: Finding the optimal number of sensors for
the best sensor selection (dynamic network). Efficacy
(a) and the fraction of detected cases (b) as a function of the
fraction of sensors and the activation time T .
Finally in Fig. A7 we can see the sensor set that is the
result of the optimization for the aggregated case.
FIG. A7: Spatial positioning of the optimal sensor
set. Red dots represent the sensor hospitals and blue dots
are (nearest) neighbors of sensor hospitals. The size of each
dot represents the mean C. diff incidence taken over the 2-year
period at the hospital.
Robustness of sensor set performance
Thte performance of statistical methods is generally quan-
tified using some error metric, and most fitting procedures at-
tempt to minimize this error in the process of finding suitable
values for model parameters. It is often possible to reduce this
training error by increasing model complexity, but generally
the goal of modeling is to have the model perform well on a
test data set, ideally an independent data set, that the model
was not trained on. Good performance on a test data set,
quantified by a low test error, generally leads to better over-
all model performance and avoids the problem of over fitting,
which refers to the model adapting to the test data too well
at the expense of poor generalizability to different realizations
of data from the same data generating mechanism.
In analogy with this approach to statistical learning, we
performed a series of analyses to investigate the performance
of sensor sets derived from one set of data and tested on an-
other. The objective of the analysis is twofold. First, it will
enable us to ascertain the validity of our methods when ap-
plied to training data, i.e., data not used to select the set of
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sensors. Two, given that there are likely temporal correla-
tions in the data, it enables us to study the performance of
sensor sets on data that are temporally far removed from the
training data.
Here we divided our data to disjoint (non-overlapping) win-
dows of width L, where we used values of 1 month, 2 months,
4 months, 6 months, and a year for L. For any given window,
we take the first window to be our training data and use all
subsequent windows as different realizations of test data. We
used the training data for generating the sensor sets (based
on in-degree, out-degree, and the greedy algorithm; we ex-
clude considerations of the random stragy here because there
is no real distinction between testing and training) and evalu-
ated the relative efficacy and the percentage of cases detected
separately for each test data window.
Although intuitively it seems that the sensor sets would
perform worse the greater the temporal separation between
the training window and test window, we found that our
methods were robust against this separation. Little variation
is observed as the validation window gets more and more sep-
arated temporally from the training window that was used
to construct the sensor sets (see Figs. A8- A10). This is
counterintuitive especially for the sensor set obtained using
the greedy algorithm because in principle we are over-fitting
our model to the data and consequently this should result in
more variability. Nevertheless, temporal correlations in the
dynamics of the system make it well behaved in this sense.
An important lesson here is that it is possible to determine
efficient sensor sets even using outdated data.
Effect of the length of the observation period on the
sensor set evaluation
The validation set approach also enables us to evaluate how
the construction of a sensor set is affected by the width of the
window used in its construction. From the results in Fig. A11
it is clear that the wider the window, the smaller the number
of sensors needed in order for the sensor set to be optimal.
The out-degree strategy is less robust with respect to this
metric, and the plots demonstrate a large difference between
the curves between 2 and 4 months. The difference is less
pronounced between the other curves.
List of hospitals included in the sensor sets
In this section we list the first 26 hospitals included in the
in-degree and out-degree strategies, as well as those that arise
from the greedy optimization approach.
In-degree strategy for the 2-year aggregated net-
work:
1. Saint Marys Hospital, 1216 Second Street SW,
Rochester, MN, kin=346, kout=103
2. Cleveland Clinic Foundation, 9500 Euclid Avenue,
Cleveland, OH, kin=286, kout=145
3. New York-Presbyterian Hospital, 525 East 68th Street,
Manhattan, NY, kin=214, kout=118
4. Mount Sinai Hospital, One Gustave L Levy Place, Man-
hattan, NY, kin=169, kout=80
FIG. A8: Out-degree strategy: training vs. test data.
Due to temporal correlations in the data, the sensor sets de-
rived from the first slice of data perform comparably to their
performance on the training set when applied to the remain-
ing slices of data as test data. In all the plots, the results for
the training set are shown as black solid lines while the red
dashed lines refer to the sensor set applied to the test data
sets. From left to right and top to bottom, the different plots
refer to window widths of 1 (a), 2 (b), 4 (c), 6 (d), and 12 (e)
months.
5. St Luke’s Episcopal Hospital, 6720 Bertner Avenue,
Houston, TX, kin=163, kout=91
6. Barnes-Jewish Hospital, 1 Barnes-Jewish Hosp Plaza,
St. Louis, MO, kin=162, kout=78
7. Massachusetts General Hospital, 55 Fruit Street,
Boston, MA, kin=159, kout=88
8. Emory University Hospital, 1364 Clifton Road NE, At-
lanta, GA, kin=151, kout=71
9. Methodist Hospital, 6565 Fannin Street, Houston, TX,
kin=151, kout=72
10. University of Alabama Hospital, 619 South 19th Street,
Birmingham, AL, kin=147, kout=79
11. Johns Hopkins Hospital, 600 North Wolfe Street, Bal-
timore, MD, kin=146, kout=74
12. UPMC Presbyterian, 200 Lothrop Street, Pittsburgh,
PA, kin=146, kout=89
13. Brigham and Women’s Hospital, 75 Francis Street,
Boston, MA, kin=142, kout=91
14. Northwestern Memorial Hospital, 251 East Huron
Street, Chicago, IL, kin=141, kout=75
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FIG. A9: In-degree strategy: information vs. val-
idation sets. The panels are arranged as above. Due to
the temporal correlation of the data the sensor sets derived
from the first slice of data perform comparably to their per-
formance on the training set when applied to the remaining
slices of data as test data.
15. Hospital of the Univ of PA, 3400 Spruce Street,
Philadelphia, PA, kin=139, kout=81
16. Clarian Health Partners, I-65 at 21st Street, Indianapo-
lis, IN, kin=136, kout=81
17. New York Univ Medical Center, 550 First Avenue,
Manhattan, NY, kin=135, kout=46
18. Kessler Institute for Rehab, 1199 Pleasant Valley Way,
Newark, NJ, kin=133, kout=51
19. Mem Sloan-Kettering Cancer Ctr, 1275 York Avenue,
Manhattan, NY, kin=133, kout=52
20. Duke University Hospital, Erwin Road, Durham, NC,
kin=132, kout=67
21. Rochester Methodist Hospital, 201 West Center Street,
Rochester, MN, kin=131, kout=27
22. Vanderbilt Univ Medical Center, 1211 22nd Avenue
South, Nashville, TN, kin=131, kout=77
23. Baylor Univ Medical Center, 3500 Gaston Avenue, Dal-
las, TX, kin=131, kout=72
24. Abbott Northwestern Hospital, 800 East 28th Street,
Minneapolis, MN, kin=126, kout=24
25. Thomas Jefferson Univ Hospital, 111 South 11th Street,
Philadelphia, PA, kin=124, kout=75
26. Lenox Hill Hospital, 100 East 77th Street, Manhattan,
NY, kin=123, kout=63
FIG. A10: Greedy strategy: information vs. valida-
tion sets. The panels and are arranged as above. Due to
the temporal correlation of the data the sensor sets derived
from the first slice of data perform comparably to their per-
formance on the training set when applied to the remaining
slices of data as test data. Nevertheless when compared to the
other strategies this is slightly more variable when compared
training and test data results.
Out-degree strategy for the 2-year aggregated net-
work:
1. Cleveland Clinic Foundation, 9500 Euclid Avenue,
Cleveland, OH, kout=145, kin=286
2. New York-Presbyterian Hospital, 525 East 68th Street,
Manhattan, NY, kout=118, kin=214
3. Saint Marys Hospital, 1216 Second Street SW,
Rochester, MN, kout=103, kin=346
4. Brigham and Women’s Hospital, 75 Francis Street,
Boston, MA, kout=91, kin=142
5. St Luke’s Episcopal Hospital, 6720 Bertner Avenue,
Houston, TX, kout=91, kin=163
6. UPMC Presbyterian, 200 Lothrop Street, Pittsburgh,
PA, kout=89, kin=146
7. Univ of TX M D Anderson Ctr, 1515 Holcombe Boule-
vard, Houston, TX, kout=89, kin=114
8. Massachusetts General Hospital, 55 Fruit Street,
Boston, MA, kout=88, kin=159
9. UCSF Medical Center, 500 Parnassus Avenue, San
Francisco, CA, kout=81, kin=107
10. Clarian Health Partners, I-65 at 21st Street, Indianapo-
lis, IN, kout=81, kin=136
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FIG. A11: Effect of observation period on the con-
struction of the sensor set. Efficacy and fraction of de-
tected cases for different lengths of the observation period. a)
random strategy, b) out-degree strategy, c) in-degree strat-
egy. d) Greedy strategy, the “best sensor set. The differ-
ent colors correspond to different window widths: 1 month
(black), 2 months (red), 4 months (blue), 6 months (purple)
and 12 months (orange).
11. Hospital of the Univ of PA, 3400 Spruce Street,
Philadelphia, PA, kout=81, kin=139
12. Mount Sinai Hospital, One Gustave L Levy Place, Man-
hattan, NY, kout=80, kin=169
13. University of Alabama Hospital, 619 South 19th Street,
Birmingham, AL, kout=79, kin=147
14. Atlanticare Regional Med Ctr, 1925 Pacific Avenue,
Camden, NJ, kout=79, kin=13
15. Barnes-Jewish Hospital, 1 Barnes-Jewish Hosp Plaza,
St. Louis, MO, kout=78, kin=162
16. Vanderbilt Univ Medical Center, 1211 22nd Avenue
South, Nashville, TN, kout=77, kin=131
17. Florida Hospital, 601 East Rollins Street, Orlando, FL,
kout=76, kin=57
18. Shands at the Univ of Florida, 1600 SW Archer Road,
Gainesville, FL, kout=75, kin=106
19. Northwestern Memorial Hospital, 251 East Huron
Street, Chicago, IL, kout=75, kin=141
20. Thomas Jefferson Univ Hospital, 111 South 11th Street,
Philadelphia, PA, kout=75, kin=124
21. Johns Hopkins Hospital, 600 North Wolfe Street, Bal-
timore, MD, kout=74, kin=146
22. Baylor Univ Medical Center, 3500 Gaston Avenue, Dal-
las, TX, kout=72, kin=131
23. Methodist Hospital, 6565 Fannin Street, Houston, TX,
kout=72, kin=151
24. Naples Community Hospital, 350 Seventh Street North,
Fort Myers, FL, kout=71, kin=27
25. Emory University Hospital, 1364 Clifton Road NE, At-
lanta, GA, kout=71, kin=151
26. Memorial Hermann Hospital, 6411 Fannin, Houston,
TX, kout=71, kin=114
Greedy algorithm:
1. Cleveland Clinic Foundation, 9500 Euclid Avenue,
Cleveland, OH, kin=286, kout=145
2. New York-Presbyterian Hospital, 525 East 68th Street,
Manhattan, NY, kin=214, kout=118
3. Saint Marys Hospital, 1216 Second Street SW,
Rochester, MN, kin=346, kout=103
4. Johns Hopkins Hospital, 600 North Wolfe Street, Bal-
timore, MD, kin=146, kout=74
5. Massachusetts General Hospital, 55 Fruit Street,
Boston, MA, kin=159, kout=88
6. Univ of TX M D Anderson Ctr, 1515 Holcombe Boule-
vard, Houston, TX, kin=114, kout=89
7. Barnes-Jewish Hospital, 1 Barnes-Jewish Hosp Plaza,
St. Louis, MO, kin=162, kout=78
8. Shands at the Univ of Florida, 1600 SW Archer Road,
Gainesville, FL, kin=106, kout=75
9. UCLA Medical Center, 10833 Le Conte Avenue, Los
Angeles, CA, kin=116, kout=54
10. Northwestern Memorial Hospital, 251 East Huron
Street, Chicago, IL, kin=141, kout=75
11. Hospital of the Univ of PA, 3400 Spruce Street,
Philadelphia, PA, kin=139, kout=81
12. Duke University Hospital, Erwin Road, Durham, NC,
kin=132, kout=67
13. Baylor Univ Medical Center, 3500 Gaston Avenue, Dal-
las, TX, kin=131, kout=72
14. Emory University Hospital, 1364 Clifton Road NE, At-
lanta, GA, kin=151, kout=71
15. UCSF Medical Center, 500 Parnassus Avenue, San
Francisco, CA, kin=107, kout=81
16. St Joseph’s Hosp & Med Center, 350 West Thomas
Road, Phoenix, AZ, kin=58, kout=43
17. Clarian Health Partners, I-65 at 21st Street, Indianapo-
lis, IN, kin=136, kout=81
18. Univ of Michigan Hospitals, 1500 East Medical Center
Drive, Ann Arbor, MI, kin=113, kout=53
19. UPMC Presbyterian, 200 Lothrop Street, Pittsburgh,
PA, kin=146, kout=89
20. Vanderbilt Univ Medical Center, 1211 22nd Avenue
South, Nashville, TN, kin=131, kout=77
21. Univ of Washington Medical Ctr, 1959 NE Pacific St,
Box 356151, Seattle, WA, kin=74, kout=31
22. University of Kansas Hospital, 3901 Rainbow Boule-
vard, Kansas City, MO, kin=95, kout=44
23. Jackson Memorial Hospital, 1611 NW 12th Avenue, Mi-
ami, FL, kin=65, kout=51
24. OU Medical Center, 1200 Everett Drive, Oklahoma
City, OK, kin=69, kout=43
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25. University of Alabama Hospital, 619 South 19th Street,
Birmingham, AL, kin=147, kout=79
26. University of Virginia Med Ctr, Jefferson Park Avenue,
Charlottesville, VA, kin=78, kout=48
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